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GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY: 
CONTROLLING THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SUPPLY IN THE 








With globalization and widespread technological advances, new 
international issues have emerged that hold critical importance for transnational 
economic integration, state sovereignty, and the future of global governance.  These 
issues notably affect the power, authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy of states as 
defined in the Westphalian system.1  Overall, the controversy over genetically 
engineered foods follows the trend that “while states were once the masters over 
markets, now it is the markets which, on many critical issues, are the masters over 
the governments.”2 The resolutions of trade disputes and international conflicts over 
genetically modified (GM) foods have taken away from state sovereignty—the 
ability for each state to make laws to regulate and control its domestic food supply—
by favoring free trade and universal standards.  Nation-states are no longer the only 
players in this arena, because international agencies, transnational biotechnology 
corporations, and non-governmental organizations have significant powers and roles 
in the decision-making process of regulating GM foods on the nation-state and 
international levels. 
The ongoing controversy over the production, international trade, and 
management of GM foods is demonstrated in the 2006 decision by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to preclude the European Union (EU) from maintaining a de 
facto ban of GM food imports.   Part II of this article will provide a background on 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), their potential benefits, and their uncertain 
risks.  Part III analyzes the U.S.-EU trade dispute, and how the WTO’s decision 
potentially increases the future likelihood of global governance and decreases the 
significance of state borders, while still allowing states to have some control of their 
domestic regulatory processes.  Part IV presents the contrary perspective, that 
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1 “Westphalian system” is term that dates back to the Westphalia peace treaty of 1648 and is generally 
used to describe the current system of nation-states with territorial integrity and national sovereignty.  See, 
e.g., Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 
251, 251 (2001) (discussing its traditional origins and questioning whether the world is moving “beyond 
Westphalia” and the “pillars of the Westphalian temple decaying”); Benno Teschke, Theorizing the 
Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism, 8 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 
5 (2002) (presenting a “new approach, revolving around contested property relations, for theorizing the 
constitution, operation and transformation of geopolitical systems, exemplified with reference to early 
modern international relations”).   
2
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(2d. ed. 2003). 
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implementing more international regulations on domestic issues, for purposes  such 
as food security and safety, detracts significantly from state sovereignty, limiting the 
abilities of nation-states to act in the best interests of their citizens, follow their 
cultural norms, or adhere to previously established international agreements.  This 
position holds that because genetically modified products are not purely international 
trade issues, global governance is not necessary and policies should be determined 
by states.  As Part V concludes, the GMOs debate evokes the central conflict 
between free markets and international economic integration versus state regulation 
and economic protectionism.  Its resolution will, accordingly, carry implications 
beyond the area of global food safety and sustainability to the ultimate 
transformation of the international political economy. 
II. BACKGROUND ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 
Genetically modified foods are created when genetic materials are altered 
using technological processes, such as recombinant DNA, that combine molecules 
from different DNA sources into single molecules.3  This technological process, 
available since 1995, can manipulate foods to create new plant varieties with unique 
benefits, including resistance to pesticides, toxicity to predatory insects, or enhanced 
nutritional contents.4  Other potential benefits of GM foods include increased 
agricultural productivity, reduced chemical usage, improved food sustainability and 
quality, and the reduction of world hunger.5  Additionally, GM foods increase the 
ability to grow crops in areas with harsh agricultural and environmental conditions.  
Today, the most common GM food crops are soybeans, cotton, and canola, such as 
herbicide-resistant cotton created by inserting herbicide resistant genes into the 
plant.6  
However, there are unknown and potentially hazardous impacts of GM 
foods on human health, food safety, and the environment.  GMOs could influence 
health by affecting the allergenicity, toxicity, and nutrition contents in food.  GM 
foods may also harm the environment through cross-pollination, damaging 
                                                 
3 For more background information on this technology, including the health and environmental risks, see 
Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution 
into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Importing 
Caution]. 
4 Charlotte Granville-West, et al., Special report 2: The WTO and EU policy towards GMOs, EUR. POL’Y 
ANALYST 47 (2006).  
5
 World Health Organization (WHO), Modern Food Biotechnology, Human Health and Development: an  
Evidence-Based Study, at iii (June 24, 2005) [hereinafter WHO STUDY], available at  
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/biotech_en.pdf.  But see Debra M. Strauss, Defying 
Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 7–19 (2007) 
(debunking the myths that this technology would reduce world hunger, decrease pesticide usage, improve  
nutritional content, and increase farmers’ income and contrasting these claims of potential benefits with 
the risks) [hereinafter Strauss, Ethical Implications].  
6
 Laylah Zurek, Comment, The European Communities Biotech Dispute: How the WTO Fails to Consider 
Cultural Factors in the Genetically Modified Food Debate, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 345, 348 (2007). 







ecosystem biodiversity, and harming traditional agriculture methods.7  There are 
fears that multinational biotech companies could crowd out local seed markets and 
farmers, or that the spread of genetically modified material could lead to the 
development of hybrid superweeds or superpests that are highly resistant to 
pesticides.8  Currently, there is inconclusive information on the negative effects of 
GM foods; additional research and risk assessments should be conducted to explore 
future consequences of manipulating genes in crops. 
Globalization has helped shaped the rise of the agricultural biotechnology 
industry.  When globalization is viewed as a permanent and structural change, it is 
clear that the recent agricultural technological advances impact trade and the 
meaning of space, because it is no longer feasible for states to engage in economic 
protectionism and new technologies are changing how people view traditional food.  
The increased internationalization of the seed industry and company mergers in the 
1990s has led to the development of expansive and powerful multinational 
corporations with sufficient capital funding for research and development.9  
Increased mechanization has heightened agricultural productivity and the demand for 
capital funding of new biotechnology projects.10  The production of goods is 
international, rather than state-based, and technological innovation leads to mass 
consumption and value-added manufactured goods.11   
 
                                                 
7 WHO STUDY, supra note 5, at 12, 20.  See also Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), Biotechnology in Food and Agriculture, FAO Statement on Biotechnology, 
http://www.fao.org/biotech/stat.asp?lang=en (last visited June 16, 2009) (recognizing the potential risks to 
human and animal health and environmental consequences, and recommending a cautious approach, 
including post-approval monitoring and “a science-based evaluation system that would objectively 
determine the benefits and risks of each individual GMO. This calls for a cautious case-by-case approach 
to address legitimate concerns for the biosafety of each product or process prior to its release”). 
8
 See Starla L. Borg, Note, Waiting for the River: The United States and European Union, Heads Up and  
High Stakes in the WTO—Genetically Modified Organisms in International Trade, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 
681, 704 (2004) (describing the backdrop of the dispute in an analogy to a game of poker and predicting a 
loss for the EU). 
9
 Marc Williams, Feeding the World?: Transnational Corporations and the Promotion of Genetically  
Modified  Food, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th  
Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb. 28, 2007,  
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179775_index.html>, at  4; see also William Lesser, Intellectual  
Property Rights and Concentration in Agricultural Biotechnology, 1 AGBIOFORUM 56 (1998). 
10 See Williams, supra note 9, at 6. 
11 According to the ETC Group’s 2005 report on the seed industry, “corporate concentration—not only in 
food and agriculture, but in all sectors related to the products and processes of life—has increased 
remarkably” so that the top 10 companies control almost half of the $21 billion commercial seed market.  
The internationalization of corporate control is dramatically evident in the 2005 figures: “Since ETC’s 
2003 report, the world’s top 10 seed companies have increased their control from one-third to one-half of 
the global seed trade and the top 10 biotech enterprises have raised their share from just over half to nearly 
three-quarters of world sales in that sector.”  ETC Group, Globalization Inc. Communiqué #91, Oligopoly 
Inc: Concentration in Corporate Power, 2005 (2005), at 2, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=44.  In addition, the top 10 publicly-
traded biotech companies accounted for almost three-quarters of the global biotech market.  Id. at 1. 





The United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada are the largest producers 
of GM foods;12 not surprisingly, then, they support biotechnology companies and the 
free trade of GMOs.  In the United States as of 2008, 92 percent of soybeans acres, 
86 percent of cotton acres, and 80 percent of corn acres were genetically engineered 
to control weeds and insects. 13  As a result, most food products in U.S. stores contain 
GMOs, without being labeled as a GM product.14  Biotech and agricultural 
companies such as Monsanto are reaping huge profits because the United States does 
not distinguish between GM and non-GM foods in its regulatory treatment; 
moreover, the government grants patents to genetically engineered technological 
processes, thereby increasing the incentive for companies to innovate.15  The 
European Union, Japan, and Australia take cautionary stances that favor food 
labeling and thorough health and safety testing before allowing GM foods to enter 
their domestic food supplies.   Particularly in the EU, consumers are concerned about 
the safety of GM foods and prefer increased transparency, labeling, and 
restrictions.16  In view of these differences in governmental regulations and public 
opinion across nation-states, one must consider whether international organizations 
should work to develop international policies that set standards and define global 
regulations for the international trade of GM foods. 
III. INCREASED FREE TRADE ENHANCES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
With international trade as paramount, the interests of biotechnology 
companies and the governments that support them reign supreme, even outweighing 
at times the boundaries of nation-states.  From this perspective, this section will 
discuss in turn the context of the U.S.-EU GMO trade dispute, its implications for the 
shift towards global governance, and the power of states to respond. 
A. The U.S.-EU GMO Trade Dispute 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission develops food standards based on 
scientific studies and qualified expert opinions.  The Codex then shares this 
information with state governments, lawmakers, and international organizations such 
as the WTO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture 
                                                 
12 KATHRYN MCCONNELL, U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORLD TRADE AGENCY UPHOLDS 
CHALLENGE OF EUROPEAN BIOTECH BAN, Sept. 29, 2006, 
http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=BFD0D73C-E01B-478C-A164-08F5E747FEEF. 
13
 USDA Economic Research Service, Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.,  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/ (last visited June 9, 2009).  
14
 The Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) estimates that 75% of all processed foods in the United 
States contain a GM ingredient, including almost every product with a corn or soy ingredient and some 
containing canola or cottonseed oil. See Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods (Mar. 23, 2005), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844/ (statement of Stephanie Childs, Grocery Manufacturers of 
America). 
15 USDA Economic Research Service, supra note 13. 
16 See Zurek, supra note 6, at 361. 







Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  Over 165 member states directly support 
Codex, and its main goals are to protect consumer health while also promoting fair 
food trade practices.17  The WTO’s mission is to promote free trade and economic 
growth; thus, the 153 member-states adopting imported food standards beyond 
Codex Alimentarius’ minimal national food safety standards must have scientific 
evidence that the imported goods significantly threaten health or safety, rather than 
merely harming domestic profits or jobs.18  Member states of the WTO can file 
complaints to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the WTO’s panel of trade experts, 
if they believe a member state has food trade policies that support state economic 
protectionism.  The WTO will then make an enforceable decision on whether the 
specific issue or policy does hinder free trade, and member-states may have to 
change their protectionist trade policies within a specified reasonable period of time.  
In the domain of the international trade of food, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement (SPS Agreement) acknowledges that states can protect 
domestic food supplies for scientific, well-documented health and safety risks, as 
long as this does not unfairly discriminate against a particular industry or country for 
unfounded reasons.19  According to this agreement, instead of banning all products, a 
state could implement less costly or less restrictive alternatives, such as mandatory 
labeling or quality testing, to sustain free trade while protecting its citizens.20   
In 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina filed a case with the 
WTO that claimed the European Commission (EC), and in particular six EU member 
states, were intentionally slow in approving GM imports on a case-by-case basis, and 
that this “undue delay” in the approval process was effectively a de facto ban of GM 
products in the EU since 1998.21  Although the EU approved one strain of genetically 
engineered corn in 2004, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Luxemburg 
nonetheless banned GM crops, even though they were approved by other EU states.22  
The moratorium cost U.S. corn producers approximately $300 million in annual 
export sales and $5.5 billion in total sales for the global biotech market.23  The 
                                                 
17
 Diahanna L. Post, The Precautionary Principle and Risk Assessment in International Food Safety: How 
 the World Trade Organization Influences Standards, 26 RISK ANALYSIS: AN INT’L J. 1259, 1262 (2006).   
18
 J. MARTIN ROCHESTER, BETWEEN PERIL AND PROMISE: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110  
(2006).  
19 Granville-West, supra note 4, at 51.  See WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].  For more on this 
treaty, see RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 333-335 
(6th ed. 2005). 
20 See Borg, supra note 8, at 692. 
21 Granville-West, supra note 4, at 47; see also Biotechnology Industry Organization, European Union 
Moratorium, http://www.bio.org/foodag/background/eumoratorium.asp (last visited June 12, 2009); Press 
Release, European Union, European Commission Regrets U.S. Decision to File WTO Case on GMOs as 
Misguided and Unnecessary (May 23, 2003), http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2003/2003036.htm.  
22 Borg, supra note 8, at 684.   
23
 CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE U.S.-EU DISPUTE (CRS Rep. 
RS21556)  





United States, Canada, and Argentina also claimed that the EU’s policies would 
harm worldwide agricultural exports, impede the development of advanced 
agricultural biotechnology, and increase negative public perceptions of GM foods.  
For example, even though there was a horrific famine in 2002 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Zambia refused genetically modified corn given as foreign aid by the United States 
because of environmental and food safety concerns, and the negative public 
perceptions about GMOs due to the EU’s moratorium.24   
From the U.S. perspective, resistance to GM foods “is fed by a potent 
mixture of scientific irrationalism, economic protectionism, and even anti-U.S. 
sentiment.”25  The United States, Canada, and Argentina asserted that decisions 
against GM foods violated the SPS Agreement due to a lack of comprehensive 
scientific evidence.26  They also claimed the moratorium violated other established 
WTO treaties, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) that ensures that international regulatory standards do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to trade, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) that promotes free trade and tariff reductions.27  
The international differences in approaches towards GM foods are reflected 
in differences in regulatory schemes.28  The United States treats GM foods the same 
as their conventional counterparts, opting not to require additional regulation or 
labeling.29  In contrast, the EU favors close regulations for new technologies with 
                                                                                                                   
(March 10, 2006), at 1 [hereinafter CRS REPORT]. 
24
 Jennifer Clapp, The Political Economy of Food Aid in an Era of Agricultural Biotechnology, 11 
GLOBAL  
GOVERNANCE 467 (2005). 
25
 Robert Falkner, The Global Biotech Food Fight: Why the United States Got It So Wrong, 14 BROWN J.  
WORLD AFF. 99, 100 (2007). 
26 Complaints by the United States (WT/DS291), Canada (WT/DS292), and Argentina (WT/DS293). 
27 Zurek, supra note 6, at 352 n. 50, 353.  See WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm; General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
28 For a discussion of the differing regulatory approaches of the United States and the EU as a reflection of 
the cultural views of risk and scientific uncertainty with the potential impact on international trade, see 
Debra M. Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food: A Model of Labeling and Monitoring With 
Positive Implications for International Trade, 40 INT’L LAW. 95 (2006). 
29 Under the U.S. scheme, no special regulations have been developed for genetically modified food 
because there is no recognition of risks inherent in the new technology: 
The United States uses health and safety laws written prior to the advent of modern biotechnology to 
review genetically engineered products. To date, the United States has not issued any new legislation for 
these products . . . agencies that were responsible for regulatory oversight of certain product categories or 
for certain product uses are also responsible for evaluating those same kinds of products developed using 
genetic engineering.  
United States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/FAQRecord.asp?qryGUID=2 (last visited June 11, 2009).  For a compilation 
of the laws currently used to regulate the products of modern biotechnology and the regulations developed 
under these statutes (the Plant Protection Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act), see United 
States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website, U.S. Laws and Regulations,  
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/lawsregsguidance.asp (last visited June 11, 2009); see also 1986 Coordinated 







uncertain implications, adhering to the precautionary principle in the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, an international agreement established to protect biological 
diversity from the risks of biotechnology.30  The precautionary principle advocates a 
cautionary approach so that insufficient or inconclusive scientific evidence on GM 
foods should lead to regulation or prohibition until further information satisfies 
safety concerns.31  As a result, the EU has strict labeling and traceability regulations 
for GM foods and EU consumers vocally disapprove of GMOs.32  The EU claimed 
that the contested bans addressed both environmental and health risk factors, so that 
GM food imports could be banned under the SPS Agreement.33  The European 
Commission also has argued that the de facto ban on GM foods was based upon 
some scientific knowledge about probable risks associated with these crops.34 
                                                                                                                   
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). 
30 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, art. 1, 
available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].  The Cartagena Protocol was 
put forth in January 2000 and went into effect on September 11, 2003, the ninetieth day after receiving the 
fifty instruments of ratification by states or regional economic integration organizations that are parties to 
the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has 
been ratified by191 parties.  See IISD Linkages, A Brief Introduction to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cbdintro.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2000).  As of June 2009, 156 
parties had ratified the Protocol.  The United States, which had signed the CBD, but had not ratified it, is 
not among them.  Canada and Argentina had signed the Protocol but did not ratify it.  For a list of the 
status of the ratifying parties, see The Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties, 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.shtml (last visited June 11, 2009). 
31 See CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 4.   
32 For example, Directive 2001/18/EC sets forth measures for assessing human health and environmental 
risks before any GM product can be released into the environment or marketed. Most significantly, this 
Directive allows a temporary ban of GM products if evidence can be provided exposing risks to human 
health or the environment.  Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L106).  See Strauss, Importing 
Caution, supra note 3, at 176–81; see also Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament 
and Council on the Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms and Regulation (EC) 
No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and Council on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 OJ 
(L268), 24 & 25; European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the 
European Community, http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/gmfood/qanda_en.pdf (last visited 
June 11, 2009). 
33 Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, supra note 19, states that ‘‘[m]embers shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, 
animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations.’’  See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. 
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 794 (2008) (analyzing 
this decision and its implications in detail) [hereinafter Strauss, Impact of the WTO]. 
34 Moreover, the EU member states sought to rely upon Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, supra note 19, 
which provides an exception to the risk assessment requirement: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international 
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review 
the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 
The WTO Panel rejected their argument that a risk assessment could not be performed due to insufficient 
scientific evidence, relying on the fact that the EU had itself performed such an assessment.  The Panel’s 
reasoning “misunderstands the very nature of scientific uncertainty that led to the EC legislation 





Despite these regulatory differences, in May 2006 the WTO made a ruling 
against the EU and its individual member states in several respects.35  Although the 
EU had legitimate concerns about the scientific uncertainties of GM foods, the WTO 
ultimately decided it had implemented protectionist policies that were not based on 
conclusive scientific research and detailed risk assessments, and thereby not covered 
under the SPS Agreement.36  The WTO distinguished between state regulations that 
address harms, and those designed for discriminatory purposes to “protect local 
industries from the effects of global competition or to achieve other competitive 
advantages in contravention of trade agreements.”37  Most significantly, the WTO’s 
decision diverged from the internationally accepted precautionary principle of the 
Cartagena Protocol, which asserts that countries can ban biotechnology products if 
there is significant scientific uncertainty.38   
It is important to note that the WTO has reached similar decisions 
promoting free trade over scientific uncertainty in the past.  In 1996, the United 
States and Canada filed a complaint with the DSB against the EU’s ban of beef 
imports containing any growth hormones on the grounds that the ban violated the 
SPS Agreement.39  Although the EU contended the hormones were a potential 
consumer health risk, the WTO overruled the EU’s ban as a violation of the SPS 
Agreement.  The ban lacked scientific certainty, was not in line with Codex’s 
international standards, and was not supported by a thorough risk assessment.40  
Instead, the WTO suggested that the EU was relying on social value judgments and 
                                                                                                                   
authorizing these provisional measures.”  See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 33, at 794-96. 
35 WTO, Reports of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, WT/DS291, WT/DS292, and WT/DS293 (Sept. 29, 2006); Strauss, Impact of the 
WTO, supra note 33, at 790-803 (discussing details of the ruling); see also WTO, Summary of the Dispute 
to Date, DS291, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (last visited June 12, 
2009); WTO, Summary of the Dispute to Date, DS292, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds292_e.htm (last visited June 12, 2009); WTO, 
Dispute Settlement, DS293, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm (last 
visited June 12, 2009). 
36 Granville-West, supra note 4, at 47.   
37
 Edward A. Morse, Sound Science and Trade Barriers: Democracy, Autonomy, and the Limits of the 
SPS Agreement 1 (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=982626>. 
38 See ROCHESTER, supra note 18, at 110. 
39 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999).  
40
 Justin J. Kastner & Rosa K. Pawsey, Harmonizing Sanitary Measures and Resolving Trade Disputes  
through the WTO-SPS Framework, 13 FOOD CONTROL 49, 51 (2002).  See Appellate Body Report, EC  
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Feb. 13, 1998), WT/DS26/AB/R; 
WT/DS48/AB/R (stating that, although Article 5.7 may reflect a precautionary approach, “the principle 
has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise  
inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in particular provisions of that Agreement”); see also  
Patrick J. Vallely, Tension Between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO: The Significance of Recent 
WTO Developments in an Ongoing Debate, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 369 (2004) (analyzing the recent Appellate 
Body decision against Japan concerning import restrictions on apples, including its impact on the conflicts  
between the Protocol and the SPS Agreement).   







cultural norms that opposed meat with residues of growth hormones.  Although 
controversial, the implementation of this decision will, in theory, lead to more 
international regulatory harmonization and free trade.41 
B. The Shift Towards Global Governance 
As detailed in the previous section, the WTO’s decision favoring free trade 
of GMOs over technological precautions has key implications for the future of 
globalization, the role of markets, and the possibility of global governance.  Overall, 
the ruling determines “how food safety, public health, and environmental health 
measures should be applied to international trade.”42  Arguably, the decision will 
open up the world economy to the potential benefits of GM foods and increase 
international trade levels, through the flows of GM goods and capital for funding 
biotechnological processes.  The move towards free trade is consistent with today’s 
increased globalization, international trade, and the mobility of goods, capital, and 
technologies that have fundamentally changed our international political economy. 
The WTO did not take a stance on the scientific implications, health, or 
safety of GM foods, and it did not look at labeling and monitoring requirements; 
rather, it only reached a decision about free trade policies.43  Extension of the 
decision could imply that the trade and regulations of GM foods are international 
issues subject to international regulatory bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO, as 
well as international standards such as those promulgated by the Codex Commission.  
Through the WTO’s decision, Codex is further legitimized as an international 
organization with power and responsibility to make key decisions about food safety.  
The WTO’s decision also expanded upon international norms by decisively going 
against the precautionary principle in application to the free trade of GMOs.44  In this 
respect, each nation-state does not have the right to implement barriers to trade, but 
states can still make decisions on some domestic issues, such as how GM foods are 
labeled and monitored once they are imported.  According to Thomas Friedman, this 
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is the “golden straightjacket” because states must remove import restrictions and 
become more open to biotechnology.45  Other countries beyond the EU will be less 
likely to ban GMOs or place restrictive labeling standards on GM foods, given the 
WTO’s decision.46  Proponents of biotechnology claim that, particularly in 
developing countries, GMOs could help solve other global issues, such as world 
poverty and hunger, by improving food supplies, nutritional values, and agricultural 
conditions, but many of these claims have proven to be unfounded.47 
Because genetic engineering is a new technology, there are still 
uncertainties as to where GMOs will fit within the international regulatory 
framework.  Perhaps the WTO is not the proper organization to make decisions on 
the safety, security, and scientific uncertainties of GM foods.  The WHO or the FAO 
could potentially be more appropriate bodies, because they take scientific evidence 
into consideration when determining international policies.  While in the United 
States the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determines both food policy and 
science, in the EU these tasks are split between the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) for scientific evidence and the European Commission for determining 
matters of policy.48  If one of the existing international organizations is not 
appropriate, responsibility for GM foods could span multiple international bodies 
each with specific spheres of authority, or a new transnational regulatory agency 
could be created as a scientific and policy-making entity to focus more specifically 
on the global food supply.49   
In the future, perhaps similar rulings by the WTO and other international 
regulatory agencies will increase the level of free trade and global governance in the 
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domain of food safety, security, and biotechnology.  With increased harmonization 
of GM food regulations across countries and an emphasis on multilateralism, 
countries will be more likely to come together to create one international body or 
agency with the ultimate authority in this domain.  Increased global governance 
could improve international cooperation in discovering new applications of 
biotechnology and using GM foods to solve global poverty and hunger.  Also, state 
borders and the specific country origins of GM foods could become less meaningful 
because of the interconnectivity of GM food products.  As a result, the WTO’s 
decision could be viewed as a step forward in sustaining globalization, international 
cooperation, regulatory harmonization, and increasing the future potential of global 
governance. 
C. The Power of States to Respond 
Based on the perspective that the WTO did make a sound decision that 
moves towards the future formation of global governance, states do still have some 
opportunities to implement regulatory changes according to their specific cultures 
and norms.  The U.S. government and biotechnology industry have heralded the 
decision to lift the EU’s de facto ban and promote the free trade of GM foods.  The 
decision clears trade barriers and creates more opportunities for GM food research, 
development, and production.  As U.S. Ambassador Peter Allgeier stated, “the 
findings of the panel uphold the principle of science-based policymaking over 
unjustified, anti-biotech policies.”50  The United States strongly supports large and 
powerful corporations, such as Monsanto, DuPont, and Dow Chemical.51  The 
United States does not favor having stricter restrictions and regulations, but seeks to 
promote the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s funding for biotechnology research 
and development.52 
In the EU, new regulations call upon the European Food Safety 
Authority to justify GM food permit applications and take more diverse GM 
products into consideration.53  No longer can the EU implement what some have 
called economic protectionism, because the entities that resisted GM crops were 
those who “had an interest in preserving access to non-GM agricultural 
markets.”54  The EFSA closely monitors GM foods for effects on heath and the 
environment, and assesses the scientific quality of each food application.  After 
passing the EFSA’s risk assessment, the GM product must be approved by the 
European Commission and the majority of member states.55  Strict labeling and 
traceability requirements maintain segregation at all stages of production, 
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shipping, processing, and storage.56  The EU has increased transparency and sped 
up the approval process, while still maintaining stringent food safety and security; 
it has not conformed its regulatory system to adhere to all of the U.S. 
biotechnology industry’s interests.  Because the laissez-faire approach of the 
United States is not spreading to the European Union, states still have the right to 
maintain some of their own regulatory processes, showing that perhaps a 
sustainable level of international harmonization can occur without the complete 
convergence of all state regulations.   
IV. DECREASED ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IMPEDES STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
An exclusively pro-trade stance fails to adequately take into account 
competing interests such as public safety and the common good.  In this sense, 
globalization removes from the citizens more direct control over their inalienable 
rights and cultural identities.  From this contrasting view, the article will next 
examine the declining authority of states, the weakening of international agreements 
and precedents, the influences of multiple actors on state sovereignty, and the 
cultural differences that hinder global governance. 
A. The Declining Authority of States 
As discussed previously, the WTO has the ability to supersede its member 
states’ national laws and policies to support free trade.57  Rather than increasing the 
future potential of global governance, the WTO’s decision “threatens internal 
governance processes and impacts national sovereignty”58 because governments have 
lost control over core responsibilities to protect domestic health, food safety, and the 
environment.  There is asymmetry in the current system because, while food laws are 
geographic and reflect nation-state values, the economy is global and the WTO has 
the authority to regulate trade.  States who are members of the WTO will now be 
compelled to alter their decision making processes on importing GM products.  In 
the EU, harmonization of laws is already difficult to achieve, because member states 
have to conform their laws to a single standard, thus balancing the autonomy of 
member states and consistency of laws.59  GM food donated to African countries as 
aid has also taken away from governmental control, because “shipments were often 
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in contravention of the national regulations of the recipient country.”60   
As the primary international organization in the area of food and 
agriculture, the FAO has supported a cautious approach that legitimizes the role of 
member states in controlling the safety of their food supply.  This policy is evidenced 
by its statement that: 
FAO is constantly striving to determine the potential benefits and 
possible risks associated with the application of modern 
technologies to increase plant and animal productivity and 
production. However, the responsibility for formulating policies 
towards these technologies rests with the Member Governments 
themselves.61 
An expansion of the WTO’s decision “could prevent national and local governments 
from setting their own environmental and human health regulations in cases where 
scientific uncertainty exists.”62 In this respect, “governments have been left with 
responsibility without power,” and states have less control over “the levers of 
economic management.”63   
According to Robert Gilpin’s definition of economic nationalism, 
“economic activities are and should be subordinate to the interests of the state.”64  
However, the WTO’s decision clearly favors the biotechnology industry over states, 
and the ruling could “be used to pressure governments to force their markets and 
fields open to agricultural biotechnology.”65 There is resistance to the WTO’s 
rejection of the precautionary principle and the ability of states to safeguard their 
domestic food supply under the SPS Agreement as international standards, clearly 
showing the “clash between the integrating forces of the world economy and the 
centrifugal forces of the sovereign state.”66  There has even been criticism that the 
standards determined by the Codex Commission give preferentiality to supporting 
trade and biotechnology, over protecting consumer interests and safety.67  
Additionally, because civil society is fragmented and there are different cultural  
perspectives on GM foods not taken into account by the WTO’s decision, it will be 
difficult in the long run to reach one global regulatory standard.68  
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B. Weakened International Agreements and Precedents 
The WTO’s free trade stance on GM foods goes against previously 
established international treaties and standards, such as the precautionary principle 
and the Cartagena Protocol.69  Although the United States does not follow these 
policies, many countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia have adopted them.70  
By undermining these established international agreements and committees, the 
WTO’s decision has detracted from state sovereignty while at the same time stepping 
away from universally accepted forms of global agreements. 
In 2003, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety became a key international 
agreement on preventative measures and GM foods.71  The treaty “obliges exporters 
to provide information on internationally traded GMOs and to seek the prior 
approval of importing countries.”72  The precautionary principle has been both soft 
law common practices and legitimate hard law, such as reflected in the Cartagena 
Protocol.  The EU applied the precautionary principle to GMOs, with the result that 
for technology with scientific risks and uncertainty, the burden of proof of safety 
falls onto the technology developer, considering the new technology harmful until 
proven safe.73  The United States holds the opposite viewpoint, that new GM 
products are assumed to be safe until proven harmful.74  The U.S. perspective is that 
the precautionary principle is simply an approach or soft law, rather than 
international hard law, and the United States did not sign the Protocol.75  When the 
United States filed its case against the EU, essentially this “was sending a message to 
developing countries not to use their rights under the Biosafety Protocol, the first 
legally binding international agreement that affirms the sovereign right of countries 
to reject or ban GMOs on the basis of the precautionary principle.”76  
In rejecting the EC’s argument that it take into consideration the rules of 
environmental international law, the WTO narrowly interpreted the Vienna 
Convention to exclude these multilateral environmental treaties as irrelevant to its 
decision on GM foods.77  Under its reasoning, these environmental treaties “need 
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only be taken into account in the improbable situation where all members of the 
WTO have ratified that particular agreement.”78 Critics have observed that “[t]o 
avoid such fragmentation of treaties in international law, a wiser approach would be 
to embrace the international instruments that have set out to address specific 
environmental areas and have evidenced such widespread support.”79   
The WTO’s resolution against the Cartagena Protocol and the precautionary 
principle as international agreements on environmental and food governance could 
weaken the legitimacy of these agreements and further remove authority from states 
that are more hesitant towards accepting GM foods without heavy regulations.  
Overall, favoring a laissez-faire, free market approach weakens the ability for states 
to use the precautionary approach to meet domestic health and environmental 
objectives. 
C. The Influences of Multiple Actors on State Sovereignty 
In addition to the decreased authority of states and the lack of legitimacy for 
the precautionary principle and Cartagena Protocol, states have also lost sovereignty 
because of the fragmentation of civil society.  According to Paul Argenti, 
“Multinational corporations and NGOs now have control of much of the agenda 
formerly dictated by governments.”80  There are multiple actors participating in the 
GM food debate, such as international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations (TNCs).  As Robert Falkner 
writes: 
It points to the growing influence of nonstate actors, and campaign 
groups in particular, in world politics; the ability of environmental 
concerns and consumer values to shape global markets; and the 
limits of U.S. power in defining the emerging global governance 
architecture for environment and food safety.81  
NGOs have taken a strong stance on this issue by speaking out against the 
WTO’s authority to legislate on environmental and food issues.  The reactions of the 
NGOs demonstrate the weakened legitimacy and future credibility of the WTO.  
NGOs believe that “the WTO is a trade body with no expertise on the 
environment.”82  Prior to the release of the WTO’s decision, fifteen public interest 
groups from four continents released an amicus curiae brief to articulate that the 
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“impatience of biotech companies and WTO rules should not be allowed to overrule 
the legitimate right of countries to make their own decisions about the safety of GM 
products.”83  The brief sided with the EU’s precautionary approach and the risks of 
scientific uncertainty.  Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and other environmental 
groups clearly believe that there should be restrictions on GMOs to protect people 
and the environment, and that governments should not be coerced into accepting GM 
foods.84  After the WTO released its decision, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
joined the international “Bite Back: WTO Hands Off Our Food!” campaign, a 
coalition calling for the right of farmers, consumers, governments, and the Cartagena 
Protocol, rather than the WTO, to make food safety decisions.85  These groups have 
argued that the ruling is “a major step back for the democratic rights of national and 
local governments to set their own environmental and health regulations when there 
is scientific uncertainty.”86  
Transnational corporations and industry associations, such as the Council of 
Biotechnology Information, Biotechnology Industry Organization, and CropLife 
International, are key political actors that remove authority and power from states.87  
Biotechnology firms actively interact with governments to shape the national 
regulations of GMOs and ensure their preferences are taken into account.88  TNCs 
can sponsor joint research activities and crop trials with governments, such as in 
2001 when Monsanto teamed up with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute to 
test the resistance of GM sweet potatoes to insects.89  Even the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture has partnered with biotechnology companies to develop the highly 
controversial “Terminator” technology, genetically engineered sterile seeds that have 
been banned by the United Nations (U.N.) as potentially hazardous to the future of 
the global food supply.90  In order to increase GM exports, TNCs have created 
alliances with governmental agencies and try to promote GM foods in the context of 
key governmental goals, such as the reduction of poverty.  At the core, biotech 
companies can tailor their arguments on the benefits of GM foods to resonate with 
policymakers and favorably influence states’ decisions. 
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D. Cultural Differences Hinder Global Governance 
Another critical argument that supports allowing each state to regulate its 
own policy on GM foods, rather than be subject to the WTO’s decisions in this 
sensitive area, points to the different cultural perspectives on genetic engineering 
technology.  These differences are manifested in the people’s trust of the 
government, their appetites for risk given scientific uncertainty, and their views on 
food safety.  According to this perspective, “the WTO fails to adequately account for 
culture values and therefore will have difficulty implementing the decision.”91  
Because the WTO’s decision on the trade of GM foods does not account for the 
essential cultural differences between states, perhaps GM foods should be only 
regulated on a nation-by-nation basis.   
In the United States, people have more faith in the government, trust its 
regulatory agencies, and generally support biotech companies.92  Unless there are 
more severe food scares in the future, the FDA will most likely continue to classify 
GM foods as “substantially equivalent” to non-GM foods.93  The National Research 
Council has even criticized the U.S. Department of Agriculture for not requiring 
inspections of the field-test experiments for GM crops and for being unaware of the 
testing that was taking place.94  Positive consumer attitudes towards GM foods are 
also prevalent in Canada and Argentina, the next two largest producers of GM foods, 
and these countries accordingly lack traceability and labeling requirements. 
Consumers in the EU are more risk adverse and demand stringent laws to 
protect their health and safety.  An EU poll in 2006 determined that more than half of 
European consumers considered genetically engineered foods to be dangerous.95  
Additionally, EU consumers have more distrust for corporations and agencies in 
adequately determining food policy because of historical food scares, such as the 
outbreak of mad cow disease in the 1990s.96  These consumers favor NGOs over the 
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biotechnology industry, and believe in the potential dangers of GM foods rather than 
the potential benefits.97  Consequently, the EU’s de facto ban on GM foods could be 
interpreted as a reaction to consumer sentiment, political pressures, and the common 
belief in the precautionary principle.  The European attitude towards food also differs 
from that of Americans, because Europeans view food as more of an expression of 
unique cultures, nationalities, and regions.98  Europeans strive to keep their historical 
cultures, rather than giving in to globalization and “McDonaldization.”99  African 
countries are likewise resistant to accept GM foods because GMOs are contrary to 
their traditional farming methods and could potentially harm ecosystems.   Farmers 
in these countries do not want to become overly reliant on the U.S. biotech industry 
or be exposed to new risks. 
The WTO trade dispute on GMOs could potentially reflect “U.S. 
unilateralism in biosafety politics”100 because the U.S. biotech firms have attempted 
to change the cultures in other countries and the U.S. government has supported the 
interests of the biotech industry.  An example of the cultural misunderstanding can 
be seen when in the mid-1990s, Monsanto launched a $5 million advertising 
campaign to support biotech products in Europe, without fully realizing that the 
consumers’ perspective was not anti-scientific or irrational, but merely a reflection of 
cultural views towards food safety and environmental issues.101 The WTO’s decision 
undermines the authority of states to best serve the interests of their citizens, and 
clearly supports the U.S. dominance in policymaking and economics.  The EU is 
caught between pressure from its citizens to highly regulate and even ban GM foods, 
and pressure from the WTO and transnational corporations not to impose stringent 
regulations. 
Because the WTO is focused only upon markets and free trade, it does not 
take into consideration crucial societal values or cultural preferences.102  Cultural 
differences make it more difficult to form international policies on GM foods that 
can eventually lead to a new form of global governance.  Because of these cultural 
differences, it is “unrealistic to expect a fully harmonized global standard for 
biosafety regulation.”103 Perhaps overcoming these cultural differences and reaching 
a global consensus will only occur in the event of an extreme crisis that either 
necessitates the use of GM foods to reduce poverty and malnourishment, or exposes 
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As globalization impacts food regulations, the potential problems include 
the obscuring of national identities, the diminishing of state autonomies, and the 
favoring of agribusiness over consumer safety in the international regulations that 
result.104  This is certainly the case with the WTO’s decision on GM foods that 
supports free trade, global markets, and biotechnology companies over cultural 
values, international agreements, and local traditional producers.  The WTO’s 
decision stands in opposition to the preferences of consumer groups, NGOs, and 
certain governments, so that global regulations propagate at the expense of state 
sovereignty and control.  Essentially, “the world community denounces the fact that 
this trade organization, which has no authority to legislate, is making decisions in the 
context of a trade dispute between a few parties on the future of the food supply of 
all.”105  The WTO places economic considerations ahead of concerns for health, 
science, safety, and the environment.  Its excessive support of the U.S. and biotech 
companies’ unilateral perspectives will weaken the WTO’s future credibility and 
legitimacy, further complicating the enforceability of its rulings.  By making 
judgments and decisions on the validity of health and environmental issues, the 
WTO legislated beyond its regulatory scope of international trade. 
In addition, the WTO weakened the application of the SPS Agreement, 
Cartagena Protocol, and precautionary principle to the international trade of GMOs 
by favoring risk assessment practices over recognition of some scientific 
uncertainty.106  The decision undermines strong, well-established international 
consensuses.  Moreover, the ruling could set a precedent against state regulations 
that are in accordance with multilateral environmental agreements.107  These 
detrimental changes may prove to be a step back in international policymaking, the 
establishment of global governance and regulatory standards, as well as the future of 
multilateral environmental and trade agreements.   
The WTO could have forged a path in its decision more by way of a 
compromise that would be sustainable in the long run.  Mandatory labeling and 
traceability requirements of genetically modified ingredients could be such a 
solution, even though multinational corporations would bear most of the labeling 
costs.  Mandating labeling of internationally traded GM foods would help address 
cultural differences and risk factors, while still allowing free trade and economic 
markets to control the process.  The Codex, FAO, and WHO could work together to 
establish these labeling guidelines that would serve as a risk management tool and 
provide consumers with more information on the presence of GM ingredients and 
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warnings about potential allergens.108  If the collaboration of already established 
international organizations is not sufficient, perhaps a new regulatory body could be 
established in the future to incorporate both the economic and scientific aspects of 
GMOs into its policies.109  
Although this article focuses upon GM foods, the issue of international 
regulations extends beyond food markets and raises the broader question of whether 
international laws and institutions should supersede state regulations to manage 
global trade and investment.  The international political economy has already been 
significantly transformed by globalization and technological advances such as 
genetic engineering.  In the future, the move towards more global governance and 
transnational agreements will by necessity serve to compromise the power of states.  
However, it will be difficult to reach a universal consensus on issues such as 
genetically modified foods that involve economic, scientific, political, cultural, 
environmental, and health issues.  Policymakers should query whether the outcome 
would indeed further the ultimate goals of the safety and sustainability of the global 
food supply. 
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